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Abstract
We analyze the formation of partnerships as a sequential game with moral hazard within
coalitions; once formed, partnerships compete a la Cournot in the marketplace. When
moral hazard within coalitions is very severe, no partnership will form. However, we show
that when moral hazard is not too severe the coalition structure will be either similar to or
more concentrated than it is without moral hazard. Concerning industry profits, without
moral hazard too many coalitions are formed in equilibrium as compared to the efficient
outcome, but moral hazard may be responsible for an inefficiency of opposite sign.
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21.- Introduction
Game theory has provided a framework to analyze market structure determination; the
incentives of firms to merge or to form associations can be usefully analyzed in games of
endogenous coalition formation with spillovers. In this literature, coalition formation is
analyzed as a two-stage game. In the first stage, players form groups and this process of
team formation is formalized as a non-cooperative game (either simultaneous or
sequential).1 Once the groups are formed, the members of each group are committed to
maximize the group's objective function in the second stage. This family of games defines
two levels of interaction among the players: first, within each coalition and, second, among
the coalitions. While the second level of interaction is formalized in a non-cooperative
way, the first one assumes complete cooperation among the coalition members.
Cooperation within a coalition can emerge if the coalition members have mechanisms that
allow them to commit to their behavior or all the relevant information is verifiable and
contracts are complete. However, one can imagine situations where full cooperation among
non-cooperative players is not possible. In other words, the abovee approach ignores that in
some circumstances players in a coalition may retain some decision-making power over the
strategic variables in the second stage, and they may not share exactly the same interests.
The problem of opportunistic behavior within coalitions can arise in games considering the
determination of market concentration and size of partnerships, when partners can free-ride
on their colleagues. It can also be present in situations like the formation of custom unions
                                                
1
 Different rules for coalition formation have been used in literature. Bloch (1995, 1996), Ray
and Vohra (1999) and Montero (1999) examine an infinite-horizon game where coalitions form
when all potential members agree. The former papers assume a fixed rule of order; in the latter,
the player who rejects an offer does not automatically become the next proposer. Ray and Vohra
(1997) consider a model where deviations can only serve to make the existing coalition structure
3or international tax agreements, where countries agree to form a coalition but keep some
room to take decisions departing from the coalition's global objective. OPEP may be cited
as an example.
Within a coalition, a problem of moral hazard arises when partners decide individually on
the second stage strategic variables.2 As Holmström (1982) proved, moral hazard in teams
leads to inefficiencies for any (balanced budget) sharing rule since team members do not
receive the total revenue from their effort.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the equilibrium coalition structures and the efficiency of
the equilibrium outcome in a model with moral hazard within coalitions, under the
assumption that productive coalitions compete à la Cournot and use an egalitarian profit-
sharing rule.3 In this context, a coalition is a set of players who agree to share output
(equally) but behave throughout the relationship in a non-cooperative way. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper that models this behavior.
To highlight the market competition and moral hazard effects we shall ignore any team
economies; adding team economies would partly obscure the moral hazard problem: big
coalitions have more severe incentive problems but (with team economies) they would be
more efficient.4 We focus on the interaction between moral hazard within the partnership,
product market competition, and the emergence of different coalition structures. Our
concern is the determination of the number of partnerships active in the market and their
                                                                                                                                                   
finer. Yi and Shin (1995) and Belleflamme (2000) study games in which non-members can join a
coalition without the permission of the existing members.
2
 See, for example, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997) for more details on incentives
and contract design under moral hazard.
3
 In this aspect, we follow Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), who define a partnership as a
coalition that divides its output equally.
4
 Bloch (1995) and Belleflamme (2000) consider the case where firms form associations in
order to decrease their costs. This aspect is also taken into account in the existing theory of
partnerships, where partners get together to exploit economies of scale (see, for example, Farrell
and Scotchmer, 1988; and Sherstyuk, 1998). In this partnership literature there is no market
competition, while in our approach partnerships form to get a higher market concentration, and
thus higher prices and profits, and they form despite the fact that there is a moral hazard problem.
4size, taking into account the demand and cost conditions. In the absence of moral hazard,
two forces affect the final market structure. On the one hand, decreasing the number of
firms implies benefits related to a lower degree of competition in the market, but, on the
other hand, a player may increase her profits by leaving a big coalition and setting up a
firm by herself. Therefore, the process of partnership formation may exhibit inefficiencies
(from the industry point of view) due to a free-riding problem among coalitions.  Hence,
too many firms are formed in equilibrium (this is a well known result; see Salant, Switcher
and Reynolds, 1984, Bloch, 1996, and Yi, 1997, among others).
The presence of moral hazard within coalitions adds a new effect to the previous ones:
building up a large coalition involves efficiency losses as the incentive problems are more
severe in larger partnerships. In the extreme case of a very severe moral hazard problem,
we show that the equilibrium market structure is very fragmented, with each player setting
up their own firm. However, if moral hazard is not so severe, not only we will not find a
very fragmented industry, but the number of coalitions will be lower than or equal to the
number that emerges without moral hazard. For intermediate levels of moral hazard, the
number of partnerships is strictly lower than without moral hazard. The reason behind this
result is that moral hazard makes it more difficult to free ride on other players, precisely
because under moral hazard other players are less willing to form large coalitions.
As far as the efficiency of the equilibrium coalition formation is concerned, without moral
hazard the grand coalition is efficient (it maximizes industry profits) but it is not an
equilibrium market structure. We show that under moral hazard this may be no longer the
case. This effect is partly due to the fact that moral hazard also affects the efficiency of the
grand coalition; when moral hazard is high enough, a monopoly is not efficient and other
market structures may yield higher industry profits.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sequential model of partnership
formation, which follows Bloch (1996)’s sequential games of coalition formation, and
derives the utility function of each partner as a function of market structure. In Section 3,
we characterize the equilibrium outcome. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion on the
robustness of our analysis. Section 5 deals with the efficiency of the equilibrium coalition
configuration. Section 6 concludes.
52.- The model
We study the interaction among (ex-ante identical) partners as a game in two stages. In the
first stage, partners group into firms through a sequential process, and in the second stage
of the game firms compete à la Cournot with a homogeneous product. First, we describe
the process of constitution of partnerships. Then we analyze the market competition stage
with a moral hazard problem inside firms. We assume that gross profits are shared equally
among the partners but they decide individually how much effort to exert; this effort is not
verifiable and cannot be contracted upon. The implication is that partnerships competing in
the market will not necessarily be profit maximizing firms. In the last part of this section
we derive the payoff function for each partner as a function of market structure.
2.1.- The partnership formation game
The total number of partnerships competing in the market is determined endogenously.
There is a fixed number of ex-ante identical partners, n, and they have to decide, before
market competition, how many partnerships they will set up. We follow Bloch (1996)'s
approach and assume partnerships are formed sequentially.
Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) analyze an infinite-horizon sequential game that
we will denote by Γ, in which a coalition forms if and only if all potential members agree
to form the coalition. There is a rule of order ρ (an ordering of the players) on the set of
partners, N, that determines the order of moves in the sequential game. Partner 1, according
to the rule of order, makes an offer to other agents to form a coalition of partners T⊂N, to
which she belongs. Each prospective member in T responds to the offer in the order
determined by ρ. If all members in T accept the offer of partner 1, the partnership is formed
and partners in T leave the game. Then, the first partner in N\T, according to the rule of
order, starts the game (with N\T players) by making a partnership proposal, and the game
continues. If any member in T rejects the offer made by partner 1, that partner makes a
counteroffer and proposes the formation of a partnership S⊂N, to which he belongs. The
game continues until all players have left the game. The outcome of this game is a market
structure, that is, a partition of the set of partners, P = {T1, T2, ..., Tr}, representing all the
firms formed.
6Bloch (1996) shows that when players are ex-ante symmetric the partitions generated by
the infinite-horizon sequential game (i.e., the stationary symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium coalition structures) coincide with the partitions generated by the following
choice-of-sizes game.5 The first partner, according to the rule of order, announces an
integer s1, interpreted as the size of the firm, and the first s1 players form a coalition. Then
partner s1 + 1 announces an integer s2, and the next s2 players form a coalition, and the
game proceeds until s1 + s2  + s3  + ...= n. We shall solve the choice-of-sizes game to
determine the equilibrium market structures brought about by partners' behavior under
moral hazard.
2.2.- The Moral Hazard Problem
Each firm A is an association of nA ex-ante identical partners who own and manage the
firm. Partners produce a homogeneous output and for simplicity we assume the only
production costs come from the effort exerted to produce. Output is normalized to be equal
to the productive effort so that the production function of firm A is:
qA= 
 
 
 
eiAΣi= 1
n A
,                                                           (1)
where qA  is output of firm A and eiA is effort exerted by partner i in firm A.
Assume that there are r associations of partners competing in the market: 1, 2, ..., r. Gross
profits (ignoring the costs of partners' effort) for each firm A, A ∈ {1, 2,..., r} are
 
  ΠA( ei1Σi = 1
n1
, ei2Σi = 1
n2
,..., eirΣi = 1
nr
) . Effort within the firm is not verifiable so that the output (or
revenue) due to each partner’s effort cannot be identified. Partners are assumed to share the
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 A property of non-decreasing equilibrium payoffs is needed for this result to hold; we discuss
this property after presenting the results. For more details on the infinite-horizon game and the
proof of this result see Bloch (1996).
7gross profits of the firm equally.6 The level of gross profits is verifiable and thus partners
can commit to an equal sharing rule in the first stage.
To compute the net profits of a firm we need to define the cost of a partner's effort, which
is assumed to be independent of the firm size, C(ei). Thus, net profits for firm A are:
                      
ΠA( ei1Σi = 1
n1
, ei2Σi = 1
n2
,..., eirΣi = 1
nr
) – C(ei)Σi = 1
n A
.
The interaction among partners in the second stage is modeled as a non-cooperative game
in which the level of effort eiA is decided by each partner i and is non-verifiable. Thus, each
partner i in firm A decides her level of effort to maximize her own payoff function:
                
 
 
 1
nA
Π
A
( ei1Σi = 1
n1
, ei2Σi = 1
n2
,..., eirΣi = 1
nr
) – C(eiA) .
Due to the moral hazard problem, this behavior implies that firms do not maximize profits.
2.3.- The Payoff Function
We shall assume that, after the process of constitution of partnerships, firms compete in the
market for a homogeneous product with linear market demand,  p = a  −  Q, where Q is
aggregate output. The production stage is formalized as Cournot competition. Gross profits
for firm A are:
 
 
 
ΠA ei1, ... , eirΣi= 1
nr
Σ
i= 1
n1
= a – e i1 + ... + e irΣi= 1
nr
Σ
i= 1
n1
eiAΣi= 1
n A
                                                
6 When partners are ex-ante identical, the equal-sharing rule is a natural division of payoffs.
Ray and Vohra (1999), in an infinite-horizon model, make the sharing rule endogenous and show
that equal sharing is an equilibrium phenomenon. Note however that in their framework the
sharing rule will influence the decision of whether (or not) to enter a coalition, while in our model
the sharing rule will also affect the incentives of the members of a coalition. Limited liability
arguments or commitment problems can lead to equal sharing rules in our framework.
8The cost of exerting effort for partner i is: C(ei) = c ei, with c < a. The situation where there
is no moral hazard within the firm will be referred to as the benchmark case.
2.3.1.- The benchmark case. Assume that there is no moral hazard on partners' decisions.
Partners' effort is verifiable, so that the cooperative level can be implemented within a
coalition. Taking into account that partners are symmetric, the best response to rival firms’
effort can be expressed as:
A
Aj
jj
A
n
cnea
e
2
∑
≠
−−
= ,
for A∈{1, ..., r}, where ej denotes the (symmetric) effort level by each partner in firm j.
Solving the system, from the optimal effort level, we have that:
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a c
rA A A
* *
= =
−
+ 1
.  (2)
Note that q*A is independent of the size of the partnership nA, and the number of members
n, and depends only on the number of firms r. This is because there is an optimal output
level for each firm as a function of market demand and cost conditions, and each firm just
divides the burden of producing the optimal output equally among its members. The payoff
function for each partner of firm A in the benchmark case is:
                                          
 
  
pii(r, nA) =
a – c
2
(r + 1)2nA .
2.3.2.- The Payoff Function under Moral Hazard. Due to the moral hazard problem, firms
do not maximize profits. Rather, each partner decides how much effort she will exert to
maximize her own objective function. Each partner in firm A will maximize her objective
function on the effort level eiA. From the first-order conditions, we obtain:
2
2∑∑
≠≠
−−−
=
ik
kA
Aj
jjA
iA
enecna
e
9for A∈{1, ..., r}, i∈A, and where ej denotes the (symmetric) effort level by each partner in
firm j for j ≠ A. Efforts are strategic substitutes: if other players (from inside or outside the
relationship) increased their effort level, the best response for a member of firm A would be
to decrease her own. Solving the system formed by the first order conditions of the n
partners, we obtain the optimal effort for each partner in firm A, and the optimal output for
firm A:
                         
[ ]
q n e
a c n r n
rA A A
A
= =
+ − +
+
( )1
1
. (3)
Given the assumption of linear demand and cost, the output level qA does not depend on
the distribution of sizes of all the coalitions in the market, but only on nA, n, and r. The
optimal effort for a partner is decreasing in nA, since the higher nA the higher the intensity
of the moral hazard problem; it is increasing in n since this variable is a measure of the
aggregate output (the relative size) of the other coalitions. The effect of cost c is positive
(or negative) if the coalition is small (big) as compared to the others. Note that, in contrast
with the benchmark case, the output of a firm depends on its size.
The distortion introduced by the moral hazard problem can be seen by comparing
expression (3) to the effort in the benchmark case, given by expression (2):
 e
A
*
– eA > 0 ⇔ nA >
n + 1
r + 1
Since   n + 1r + 1 is approximately the average size of coalitions, for coalitions of a size higher
than the average, moral hazard causes a distortion in the usual direction, that is, it decreases
output. However, for coalitions of a size lower than the average the “best response effect”
(or strategic effect) dominates the partners’ incentives to take an opportunistic decision on
their effort. For these relatively small coalitions, the fact that rivals have a more serious
moral hazard problem than theirs induces them to expand output. With market competition,
what is important is how serious a firm's moral hazard problem is as compared to the
average moral hazard problem of its rivals, since this comparison determines the
relationship between own and rivals' production cost.
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We can also compare total output in the benchmark case and under moral hazard, for a
given coalitional structure. From the expressions:
1
*
+
−
=∑
r
rcra
ne j
j
j ,        and        1+
−
=∑
r
cnra
ne j
j
j ,
the intuitive result that total output is lower under moral hazard can immediatly be
checked. Moral hazard reduces production, even if the smaller coalitions produce more
output than in the benchmark case. The strategic effect does not offset the overall distortion
associated to moral hazard. From the foregoing expressions, it can also be checked that this
distortion associated to moral hazard within coalitions is decreasing in r and increasing in n
and c. Total output in the benchmark case depends only on the number of coalitions while
with moral hazard it also depends on the total number of players, which summarizes (in
this linear model) the overall inefficiency due to the size of the coalitions; note that the
distorsion introduced by moral hazard disappears when r = n.
Substituting the equilibrium efforts, the payoff for a partner can be expressed as:7
 
 
 pii (r,nA) = 1nA
a + cn
r + 1 – c
a + cn
r + 1 – cnA
 
.
                                      (4)
Given the parameters of the model (n, a, c), payoffs depend on nA and r. This payoff
function for each of the n players, derived from competition in the product market, gives
the payoff to each partner as a function of the market structure, and it will determine the
outcome of the partnerships’ formation game.
3.- On the equilibria of the sequential partnership formation
game
We denote by ∆(n, a, c) the sequential game of size selection with n players, demand
parameter a, unit cost c, and payoffs given by (4). We recall the description of the  choice-
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 If demand and cost were non-linear, profits (with or without moral hazard) would depend also on
the sizes of other coalitions.
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of-sizes game. Player 1 starts the game and chooses an integer s1 in the set {1, 2, …, n}.
Player s1 + 1 then moves and chooses an integer s2 in the set {1, 2, …, n − s1}, and so on.
The game continues until the sequence of integers (s1, s2, .., sr) satisfies si
i
r
=
∑
1
 = n.
Any subgame of ∆(n, a, c) such that, h coalitions have been formed already, h  ≤
 
n − 1, and
the number of players who have not yet been assigned to any partnership is x, x  ≤
 
n − h,
will be denoted by the pair (h, x).8 In subgame (h, x), the player who makes the first
announcement is player (n − x+1) and she chooses sh+1 in the set {1, 2, …, x}.
A first result states the intuitive outcome that if moral hazard is very severe, which in our
model can be interpreted as c big as compared to a, then no player will join a coalition in a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). That is, partnerships are not sustainable in
equilibrium.
Proposition 1.- If the degree of moral hazard is high enough, 
a
c
n
n
<
− 1
, the unique SPE
partition is all singletons.
Proof.- See Appendix.
The next two lemmas state technical results that will help us to analyze the outcome of the
choice-of-sizes game.
Lemma 1.- Consider that player (n − x + 1), deciding in subgame (h, x), has to choose size
s, under the assumption that the remaining (x − s) players will announce size 1 when it is
their turn. Then, her optimal choice is either s = 1, or s = x. Formally:
 
  max1 ≤ s ≤ x pin-x+1(h+1+x−s, s)
                                                
8
  In our model, at any time in the game, h and x are the only relevant variables. More precisely,
(h, x) is a set of subgames with the same h, the same x and the same player (n−x+1) deciding
(although other aspects of the history may be different). All these subgames are equivalent as far
as the decisions of player (n−x+1) and subsequent players (according to the rule of order ρ) are
concerned.
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always has a corner solution.
Proof: See Appendix.
In order to identify the corner solution of the maximization problem presented in Lemma 1,
define the function g(h, x) as:
g h x h x h xn x n x( , ) ( , ) ( , )≡ + − +− + − +pi pi1 11 1 ,
where pi
n-x+1 is the function defined in (4). When g(h, x) is positive, the x players who have
not entered any partnership yet are better off joining a partnership than they are as
singletons. When g(h, x) is negative, however, they would rather form x firms than a single
firm.
Lemma 2.- (i)    For any subgame (h, x) of ∆(n, a, c):
sign[  
 g(h,x) ] = sign[(a+cn) (x  −  (h+1)2)  −  c (h+2) (x2  −  (h+1)2)].
(ii) A necessary condition for g(h, x) ≥  0
 
is that:
                               x  −  (h+1)2 > 0.
(iii) In a subgame (h, x) such that x ≤ (h+1)2, it is the case that g(h’, x’) < 0 for any
subgame (h’, x’) of (h, x).
Proof:  See Appendix.
Lemma 2 (i) rewrites the condition on the sign of g(h, x) in terms of the parameters of the
game. Part (ii) gives a necessary condition for the sign of this function to be positive, i.e.
player (n − x+1) prefers forming a coalition with all the remaining players than a situation
in which all of them remain as singletons. Part (iii) says that if x ≤ (h+1)2, then it is better
for player (n − x+1) in subgame (h, x), and also for all the remaining players in the game,
staying as singletons (s = 1) than joining all the subsequent players.
We now analyze the outcome of the game ∆(n, a, c). More precisely, we are going to
provide necessary conditions for coalition structures to be sustainable in a SPE of the
game. For convenience, we shall consider that the player who is indifferent between
13
forming a coalition with the remaining players or breaking apart and inducing all the
remaining players to form singletons, will choose to form the coalition. The following
proposition starts the analysis by providing simple necessary conditions for the two
extreme coalition structures, monopoly and all singletons, to emerge.
Proposition 2.- (i) A necessary condition for monopoly to be an equilibrium coalition
configuration is g(0, n) ≥  0, i.e.,  ac ≥  n + 2.
(ii) A necessary condition for all singletons to be an equilibrium coalition configuration is
g(0, n) < 0, i.e.,  ac < n + 2.
Proof.- (i) A monopoly forms only if s1 = n. We claim that this cannot be an equilibrium if
g(0, n) < 0, since s’1 = 1 is a better strategy for player 1. Indeed, after s’1 = 1, the worst that
can happen to player 1 is that the other players also choose si = 1 and this is preferred by 1
to monopoly because g(0, n) < 0. Also, using Lemma 2 (i), it is easy to check that  ac < n +
2 is equivalent to g(0, n) < 0.
(ii)   ac ≥  n + 2 is equivalent to g(0, n) ≥  0. In this case, player 1 would rather form a
monopoly by choosing s1 = n than play a strategy that will lead to an n-poly.    Q.E.D.
In the following proposition we provide necessary conditions for other coalition structures
to emerge. The argument goes as follows. For an r-poly to be an equilibrium structure, it is
necessary that at least in one continuation of the game, once (r−1) coalitions have been
formed, the deciding responsible player should join all the others. The proposition
reproduces this argument in terms of the parameters of the model.
Proposition 3.- A necessary condition for an r-poly to be an equilibrium coalition
structure, with n > r ≥  2, is:
 
a
c ≥  
( )( )( )
( )
r n n r
n r r
+ + − +
+ − −
1 1 2 1
1 2
 − n,            when n < r (1 + r + r 2 1− ) − 1, or
 
a
c ≥  2 1 1
2r r r r( )( )+ + −  − n,         when  n ≥  r (1 + r + r 2 1− ) − 1.
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The above condition is also necessary for an r -poly to be an equilibrium outcome, for any
r , with n > r ≥  r.
Proof.- The proof is merely outlined here. See the complete proof in the Appendix. It
proceeds in several steps. We first prove that, for r < n, a necessary condition for an r-poly
to be an equilibrium coalition configuration is that g(r − 1, x) ≥  0, for some x ≤  n − r + 1.
Then, we rewrite this necessary condition in terms of the parameters of the model. Finally,
we prove that the necessary condition for an r-poly to emerge must also be satisfied for an
r -poly to emerge, with r ≠ n and r ≥  r ≥  2. Formally:
    ] ][ ]g r x x r n r( , ) , ,− ≤ ∀ ∈ − +1 0 12 ⇒ ] ][ ]g r x x r n r( , ) , ( ) ,< ∀ ∈ + −0 1 2 . Q.E.D.
To see if the number of firms in an equilibrium coalition configuration can be very high,
lets us consider the maximum possible number of partnership, excluding the possibility
that all players stay alone.  In other words, we derive an upper-bound to the number of
coalitions that can possibly constitute an equilibrium coalition structure, different from all
singletons.
Proposition 4.-  If  an r-poly, with r < n, is an equilibrium coalition structure, then r ≤
r
max(n), where:   rmax(n) = − + +1 5 42
n
.
Proof.- For an r-poly to fulfill the necessary condition derived in Proposition 3,  there must
exist a non-degenerate interval with r2 < x ≤  n − r + 1. Hence, the maximum r that can be
stable is the rmax such that (rmax)2 = n − rmax + 1, i.e., rmax(n) = − + +1 5 42
n
. Q.E.D.
First of all, note that the upper-bound rmax(n) defined in Proposition 4 coincides with the
number of coalitions in the equilibrium structure when there is no moral hazard. Bloch
(1996) shows that without moral hazard the equilibrium coalition configuration is such that
all the first players choose to be singletons and the last coalition is formed by the last (the
first integer previous to) rmax(n) players. (For more details, see Bloch 1996, p. 122). Note
that rmax(n) is increasing in n.
15
When the moral hazard problem is not very severe (a/c ≥ n+2), we know (by Proposition
2ii) that all singletons cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Proposition 4 states that, in this
case, the equilibrium coalition structure is never more deconcentrated than without moral
hazard. In fact, for some values of the parameters it is strictly more concentrated.9 This is
the case even if moral hazard creates an inefficiency that grows with the size of the
coalition and one would expect that partners would then try to avoid it by forming smaller
groups than in the benchmark case. The intuition is related to the sequential nature of the
game. Consider first the case without moral hazard. In equilibrium, the first players free-
ride on the last players by standing alone, until the point where the deciding player faces
the alternative of inducing an all-singleton outcome or to joining the remaining players in a
single coalition. With moral hazard this free-riding by the first players is more difficult.
The last players find forming a big coalition very harmful and they are only ready to group
into small coalitions in concentrated markets. It may be the case that they are willing to
form a partnership only in environments where the previous players have also joined
coalitions. Anticipating this reaction, the first players have less incentives to split off. This
effect may lead to a more concentrated structure than the equilibrium outcome without
moral hazard.
In the following Corollary, we summarize the most relevant feature of the equilibrium
outcomes.
Corollary 1.- For a given n, the equilibrium coalition structure with moral hazard is either
the most deconcentrated outcome (all singletons) or one structure containing a number of
coalitions lower than or equal to the number of equilibrium coalitions without moral
hazard.
In our model of Cournot competition with moral hazard, we cannot go further and provide
and explicit expression for the size and composition of partnerships at equilibrium as a
function of the parameters of the model (a, c, n). However, we can compute the
equilibrium outcome for given values of n. In Table 1 we present the equilibrium outcome
                                                
9
 Our measure of market concentration is just the inverse of the number of partnerships.
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for n =18. The last row indicates the equilibrium outcome in the benchmark case (without
moral hazard).
[Insert Table 1]
From Table 1 we see that, unless c is high enough (  ac < 20) so that the only sustainable
partition is all partners as singletons, moral hazard makes the equilibrium market structure
either similar to or more concentrated than the benchmark case. As the game is sequential,
the first players know that moral hazard would prevent the last players from forming large
groups; the threat of a less concentrated market structure makes the first players choose not
to stand alone. In fact, as this example illustrates, this threat induces the first player to find
it optimal to form a coalition with some other players in order to leave a low enough
number of players in the game so that it is profitable for them to collude.
4.- On the robustness of the results and the effects of moral
hazard under other stability concepts
We have shown the effects of moral hazard in a finite choice-of-sizes game. The interest of
this game comes from the following equivalence result by Bloch (1996) and Ray and
Vohra (1999): In a symmetric offer and counteroffer infinite game Γ, any symmetric
stationary perfect equilibrium coalition structure can be reached as the outcome of a finite
game of choice of coalition sizes ∆. Moreover, if the equilibrium coalition structure of the
finite game has the property that players' payoffs are non-increasing in the order in which
coalitions are formed, then any equilibrium outcome of the game of choice of coalition
sizes ∆ can be obtained as a symmetric stationary equilibrium coalition structure of the
sequential infinite game of coalition formation Γ.
However, as the example in Table 1 illustrates (for n = 18), in our model there are values of
the parameters (a, c, n) such that the payoffs of the first players are lower than the profits
of the last ones (that is for a/c ∈ [27, 28.2)). For those parameter values there is no
symmetric stationary equilibrium of the infinite game; nevertheless, in those cases the
choice-of-sizes game still identifies an outcome that, as we show in the Appendix,
corresponds to an asymmetric stationary equilibrium in the infinite game Γ. The idea for
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constructing such an equilibrium of Γ is simple. When players' payoffs are increasing in
the order in which coalitions are formed, then there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium
since any player will prefer to deviate (to reject the offer and to make an unaccepted offer)
in order to be in the last coalition (or the one having the highest payoffs). The asymmetric
equilibrium presented in the Appendix is based on strategies such that a set of players
agree to form the first coalition in order to avoid an infinite playing of the game.
Even when the property holds (and the equivalence between the finite choice-of-sizes game
∆ and the infinite game Γ holds) the question remains as to whether moral hazard would
have the same effect (increasing market concentration) had we used a different game. To
analyze this point we have looked into the effect of moral hazard in some other coalition
formation games and different stability notions.
A first observation is that the effect of moral hazard pointed out in this paper will not be
present unless the game is somehow sequential. Moral hazard makes unilateral defections
from a coalition more profitable so that, if the game with payoffs (4) is one-shot (see Yi
and Shin (1995) exclusive membership game), sustaining a concentrated coalition structure
(as a NE or a CPNE) is made harder when moral hazard is introduced.
We briefly consider here the effect of moral hazard using another sequential solution
concept. Ray and Vohra (1997) introduced the notion of equilibrium binding agreements. A
coalitional structure is an equilibrium binding agreement if there is no profitable deviation
for any set of players, but deviators take into account what happens after the deviation, in
particular, the strategies of the complement are not taken as given (the complementary
coalitions may break up).  Ray and Vohra define a profitable deviation (from one coalitional
structure to another) for a set of players as a deviation satisfying the following conditions:
(i) the final structure is an equilibrium binding agreement, (ii) the deviating players must be
a sub-coalition of one of the initial coalitions, (iii) the deviating set of players must gain
from this move, and (iv) the other deviators fear a worse outcome if they do not move.10 In
this framework, under moral hazard the threat of inducing a deviation into a very
                                                
10
 See Ray and Vohra (1997) for the formal definition.
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competitive market may induce a more concentrated structure (as compared to stable
structures without moral hazard). To discuss the effect of moral hazard, we present the
results for n = 6 in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2]
For n = 6, with no moral hazard, the most concentrated stable outcomes are triopolies. With
moral hazard, some of these triopolies are unstable when moral hazard is strong enough. As
in Section 3, for 
a
c
 high enough we have the same result as without moral hazard. However,
when the moral hazard problem is important more concentrated structures are stable,
because then the asymmetric triopoly structure {1, 2, 3},{4, 5},{6} is no longer a stable
outcome; the larger coalition is suffering from an important inefficiency and the deviation to
all singletons is profitable. This effect makes some duopoly coalition structures stable under
moral hazard. For example, for 
a
c
 ∈ [57, 106[, if a subset of players deviates from {1, 2, 3,
4, 5},{6} they will not reach a triopoly, but the stable outcome ({1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}),
where competition is very strong.
5.- Industry Efficiency
In this section we briefly discuss the efficiency of the outcome of the sequential process of
partnership formation described above. An efficient partnership configuration is defined
here as one that (given that partnerships compete in the market in the second stage) yields
the highest industry profits among all the market structures.
With no moral hazard the efficient outcome is always the grand coalition, where industry
profits are maximized. The equilibrium market structure may be inefficient since duopoly
or even less concentrated market structures obtain in equilibrium. Moral hazard adds an
element of inefficiency to large firms which can make the grand coalition inefficient.11
                                                
11
 Another way of understanding this point is that without moral hazard the grand coalition will
decide to form a single firm, while with moral hazard the grand coalition may decide to set up
more than one firm.
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Remark 1.- With moral hazard, the equilibrium market structure may be efficient.
We present an example where this happens to be the case. Let us consider the example of n
= 18. It can be easily checked that for some parameter configurations equilibrium is an
efficient outcome. More precisely, we find values of c for which the outcome maximizes
industry profits,    ac ∈ [46,84), which is never the case in the absence of moral hazard.
When c is very low (  ac ≥ 84) too many coalitions are formed. The reason for this
inefficiency is the usual free-riding problem already present in the benchmark case. 12
6.- Concluding comments
Previous work on endogenous coalition formation with externalities (spillovers) is based
on the assumption that the outcome of a coalition should be efficient for that coalition.
Even though there is interaction among the players at two levels: within each coalition and
between coalitions, the first aspect has been neglected in the non-cooperative models of
coalition formation. The only aspect of that interaction that has been taken into account is
the definition of the sharing rule agreed upon by the coalition members. However, there is
a great deal of literature dealing with the inefficiencies that arise within groups due to
imperfect effort observability, the lack of incentives to cooperate, and the lack of
commitment capacity. This is the aim of our analysis: to provide some insight on the
effects that the internal organization of coalitions may have on the equilibrium coalition
structure.
In a model with ex-ante identical players, we analyze the non-cooperative process of
coalition formation (this process is formalized as in Bloch, 1995, 1996), with a moral
hazard problem within coalitions, and we study the equilibrium number and size of
coalitions. As compared to the case where members in a coalition fully cooperate, we show
that when moral hazard within coalitions is high enough, no coalition will form. However,
and this result is more surprising, when moral hazard is not too severe the coalition
                                                
12
 For low values of a/c the comparison is more artificial since the production of the firms in the
efficient configuration may not be interior.
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structure will be either similar to or more concentrated than without moral hazard (that is, a
lower number of partnerships in a subgame perfect equilibrium).
To emphasize some of the aspects of the relationship between the incentive problems
within partnerships, market competition, and stability of coalitional configurations, we
have ignored other important elements of partnership organization. The firm may embody
interactions (joint task responsibilities, or specialization) between agents that increase the
productivity of a worker when they work in a large team. Another central aspect of the
model is that we obtain our results under the assumption that a coalition splits gross profits
equally. Under moral hazard the sharing rule is crucial, not only in deciding whether to join
a coalition or not, but also because it determines the partners’ effort decision and
consequently, gross profits. The lower the share of a partner, the more opportunistically she
will behave. However, equal sharing is the most natural sharing rule in a symmetric
framework and represents the spirit of what it is understood as a partnership.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.- From (4) we can deduce that pi(r, s) > 0 if and only if a
c
+ n − s −
s r > 0, i.e., s < 
a c n
r
/ +
+ 1
. (Note that pi(r, 1) > 0 for any r). Summing up for the r coalitions
we have that n < r 
a c n
r
/ +
+ 1
 is a necessary condition for pi(r, s) > 0, which can be rewritten
as 
n
r
a
c
< .
If 
n
r
a
c
>  for any r < n, then the necessary condition for all the coalitions to have positive
profits does not hold. Thus, 1 <
a
c
n
n
<
− 1
 is a sufficient condition for the partition r = n to
be the only SPE partition.                       Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.-
 Player (n−x+1) deciding in subgame (h, x) the optimal size s, under
the assumption that the rest of the players will remain singletons, solves:
 
 
 
 
max1 ≤ s ≤ x
a
c + n – (h + x – s + 2) ac + n – s (h + x – s + 2)
s h + x – s + 2 2
The first-order derivative has the same sign as:
G(s) ≡  −  (  ac  + n  −  (h + x + 2)) (h + x + 2  −  3 s)  −  s2 (h + x  −  s).
For s = 1, G is negative (and the objective function is decreasing). Now, given that G'(s) =
3 (  ac  + n  −  (h + x + 2))  −  2 s (h + x) + 3s2, and G"(s) =  −  2 (h + x) + 6 s, we know that
G'(s) has a minimum at s =   h + x3 . At this point: G'(   
h + x
3 ) = 9 [  
a
c  + n  −  (h + x + 2)]  −
h + x 2
3 .  Consequently:
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(a) If 9 (  ac  + n  −  (h + x + 2))  −  (h + x)2 > 0, G'(s) is always positive, and G(s) is always
increasing.
(b)  If 9 (  ac  + n  −  (h + x + 2))  −  (h + x)2 < 0, then G'(   h + x3 ) < 0 and G'(s) has two zero
values (possibly outside the range of our parameter selection). G'(s) = 0 for
 
 
 
s =
(h + x) ± (h + x)2 – 9 ac + n – (h + x + 2)
1
2
3
. At the lowest of these values G(s) is
negative.
In both cases, G'(s) goes from a negative value at s = 1, to a (possibly) positive expression.
Hence, the objective function is either decreasing in s or convex in s. In any case the
solution to the maximization problem will be reached at a corner. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.-
2 (i)  By the definition of g(h, x):
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Then:  sign[   g(h,x) ] = sign[(a+cn) [(h+x+1)2 − x(h+2)2]  −  c[(1+x) (h+2) (h+x+1)2  −  2x
(h+2)2 (h+x+1)]] = sign[(a+cn) (x  −  (h+1)2)  −  c (h+2) (x2  −  (h+1)2)]. Q.E.D.
2 (ii) From Lemma 2 (i), if x  −  (h+1)2 < 0 and x2  −  (h+1)2 ≥ 0, then g(h, x) < 0. If  x  −
(h+1)2 < 0 and x2  −  (h+1)2 ≤ 0, it can be checked that g(h, x) < 0. Thus, x  −  (h+1)2 > 0 is a
necessary condition for g(h, x) ≥  0. Q.E.D.
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2 (iii)  From Lemma 2 (ii), assume that x ≤ (h+1)2, and hence g(h, x) < 0. Let us consider
any subgame (h’, x’) of  (h, x). Then x’ < (h’+1)2 given that h’ > h and x’ < x. Therefore,
g(h’, x’) < 0.            Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.- We define a function φ(h, x) = (h + 2)[x
2
– (h + 1)2]
x – (h + 1)2 , in the
interval n − h ≥  x > (h+1)2. Note that the argument that max x  g(h, x) is the same as the
argument that min x φ(h, x). Moreover,  ac  ≥ φ(h, x) − n is equivalent to g(h, x)  ≥  0; and  ac <
min x φ(h, x) − n is equivalent to max x g(h, x) < 0. Finally, it is easy to check that φ(h, x) is
an increasing function of h and it is convex in x. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1.- Let us define x(h) as the value of x that minimizes φ(h, x). Then,
x(h) = (h + 1) (h + 1 + h h2 2+ ).
Moreover, x(h) is increasing in h.
Proof.-  From the second-order derivative, it is easy to check that (in the relevant range)
φ(x, h) is convex in x. From the first-order derivative of φ(x, h) with respect to x we can
conclude that the minimum is reached at the solution of the following equation:
x
2
 − 2 x (h + 1)2 + (h + 1)2 = 0.
The solutions to this equation are:
x(h) = (h + 1) ((h + 1) ± h h( )+ 2 ).
Taking into account that we restrict our attention to x > (h + 1)2, we can conclude that the
minimum is reached at x(h) = (h + 1) ((h + 1) + h h( )+ 2 ). This function is increasing in h.
In fact, the solution in the set of natural numbers is an integer after or before x(h). We will
show in due course that this is not a problem when looking for necessary conditions.
Step 2.- For r < n, a necessary condition for an r-poly to be a stable coalition configuration
is that g(r − 1, x) ≥  0, for some x ≤  n − r + 1.
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Proof.- For an r-poly to be stable, it is necessary that (r  − 1) coalitions must be formed,
there must then be at least two remaining players and the player taking the decision must
choose to form a single coalition with all of them, or it must already be player n’s turn. We
are going to show that a necessary condition for the above property to hold is that there is
at least one x, x ≤  n − r + 1, for which g(r − 1, x) ≥  0.
We do the proof by contradiction, i.e., we assume that g(r − 1, x) < 0, for all x ≤  n − r + 1,
and we show that:
(a)  if (r − 1) coalitions have been formed and there are at least two players, the deciding
player will never form a single coalition,
(b)  a situation in which (r − 1) coalitions have been formed when player n is called to play
cannot be part of an SPE of the game.
(a) Suppose that (r − 1) coalitions are formed and there are x ≥  2 remaining players. Since
g(r − 1, x) < 0, player n − x + 1 (who is called to play) prefers the remaining players to split
off rather than forming a single coalition. We now claim that for player n − x + 1 staying
alone (i.e., choosing s
r
 = 1) is better than forming a single coalition (choosing s
r
 = x).
Indeed, from this player’s point of view, the most damaging strategy by the subsequent
players is for them to remain singletons (if any subgroup decided to form a coalition, the
profits of player n − x + 1 would increase). Even in this case, profits for player n − x + 1 are
higher than if she decides to form a single coalition.
(b) Suppose that (r − 1) coalitions are formed before player n. Now, take the last coalition
formed containing x ≥  2 players (note that we can put forward this argument because r <
n). For the player that forms this coalition, it must be the case that  pi(r, x) ≥  pi(r + x, 1),
i.e., g(r − 1, x) ≥  0, which contradicts our assumption.
Step 3.- For r < n, a necessary condition for an r-poly to be a stable coalition configuration
is:
i)  a
c
 + n ≥
( )( )( )
( )
r n n r
n r r
+ + − +
+ − −
1 1 2 1
1 2
 ,  if  x(r − 1) > n − r + 1, or
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ii)  a
c
 + n ≥  2 1 12r r r r( )( )+ + − ,   if x(r − 1) ≤  n − r + 1.
Proof.- First note that for any 1 ≤  x ≤  r2, we always have that g(r − 1, x) < 0. By Step 2, a
necessary condition for an r-poly to be a stable coalition configuration is that g(r−1, x) ≥  0
for some x ≤  n − r + 1, i.e., g(r − 1, x) ≥  0  for some r2 < x ≤  n − r + 1. This condition is
equivalent to: 
a
c
 + n ≥  Min φ(r − 1, x) , for r2 < x ≤  n − r + 1.
i)  If  n − r + 1 < x(r − 1) then the minimum is reached at x = n − r + 1. Then, a necessary
condition for r-poly to be a stable coalition structure is 
a
c
 + n ≥  φ(r − 1, n − r + 1) =
( )( )( )
( )
r n n r
n r r
+ + − +
+ − −
1 1 2 1
1 2
.
ii)  If  n − r + 1 ≥  x(r − 1) then the minimum is reached at x(r − 1). Then, a necessary
condition for r-poly to be an stable coalition configuration is 
a
c
 + n ≥  φ(r − 1, x(r − 1)) =
2 1 12r r r r( )( )+ + − .13
Step 4.- ] ][ ]g r x x r n r( , ) , ,− ≤ ∀ ∈ − +1 0 12 ⇒ ] ][ ]g r x x r n r( , ) , ( ) ,< ∀ ∈ + −0 1 2 .
Proof.- The previous implication is equivalent to
                                                
13
 As we have already mentioned, x(r − 1) need not be a natural number. But
] ]{ }Min r x x r n r x Rφ( , ), , ,− ∀ ∈ − + ∈1 12 ≤ ] ]{ }Min r x x r n r x Nφ( , ), , ,− ∀ ∈ − + ∈1 12 .
Therefore, ] ]{ }a
c
n Min r x x r n r x R+ ≥ − ∀ ∈ − + ∈φ( , ), , ,1 12 = φ(r−1, x(r−1)) is also a
(weaker) necessary condition for an r-poly to be a stable coalition structure.
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] ]{ }a
c
n Min r x x r n r+ < − ∀ ∈ − +

φ( , ), ,1 1
2 ⇒
] ]{ }a
c
n Min r x x r n r+ < ∀ ∈ + −

φ( , ), ( ) ,1
2
.
This in turn is equivalent to:
] ][ ]Min r x x r n rφ( , ), ,− ∀ − +1 12 < ] ][ ]Min r x x r n rφ( , ), ( ) ,∀ + −1 2 . This condition holds
since: a) φ is increasing in h, and b) φ(r − 1, n − r +1) < Min φ(r, n − r). Q.E.D.
An asymmetric stationary equilibrium of the infinite game Γ
Let us denote by S1, S2, ..., Sh the coalitions already formed at subgame (h, x); X =
N\ ∪ hk=1Sk, the players not allocated to a coalition yet, and S(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) is the ongoing
proposal. A strategy for a player must specify an answer to any proposal made to her if she
is not the proposer, and a proposal when she is. Formally,
σi(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) ∈ {Yes, NO}           if S(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) ≠  ø
σi(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) ∈ {S ⊂  X, i ∈ S}       if S(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) = ø
When S(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) ≠  ø, player i is a respondent to the offer by some other player;
when S(S1, S2, ..., Sh, X) = ø, it is player i’s turn to make an offer. If the strategy’s
prescription at any subgame depends only on the number of coalitions previously formed
and the number of players still in the game, we simply write σi(h, x).
For n = 18 and [ [a
c
∈ 27 28 2, . , let N1 = {1, 2, ..., 10} and N2 = {11, ..., 18}. Consider the
strategy profile for game Γ shown in Table 4. It is easy to check that the equilibrium is not
symmetric since players in N1 and N2 follow different strategies; it is stationary because
players’ strategies depend only on (h, x).
[Insert Table 3]
Given the one-stage deviation principle for infinite games, in order to check that the
strategies lead to a subgame perfect equilibrium it is sufficient to check that there is no (h,
28
x) where a player can gain by deviating from the action prescribed by the strategy for that
history and conforming to the initial strategy thereafter. The one-stage deviation principle
holds whenever the infinite game is continuous at infinity, i.e., the events in the distant
future are relatively unimportant, which is the case in our infinite game if future payments
are discounted.
In order to check the equilibrium, note first that for n = 18:
a
c
≥ ⇔27 g(1, 8) ≥  0  and   a
c
< ⇔28 2.   g(1, 9) < 0.
In this interval, g(2, x) is always negative. Then, once two coalitions have been formed, the
best response for any remaining player is to stay alone, as the strategy in Table 3 states.
When one coalition has been formed, only coalitions sized 8 or less are profitable, as
prescribed by the strategy. The only asymmetry is in the prescribed actions for different
players when no coalition has been formed. Ten players, from 1 to 10, are ready to form a
10 player coalition, while the others are not. For the first players, there is no gain in
deviating to any other action (that will induce too much competition) since  the last players
will only join a coalition if the first players have done so before. Q.E.D.
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         Demand
and cost conditions
Equilibrium market
        structure Partition
 
a
c ∈ (1, 20) singletons [{1},{2}...,{18}]
 
a
c ∈ [20, 27) monopoly [{1, 2, ...., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [27, 28.2) duopoly [{1, ...,10},{11, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [28.2, 30) duopoly [{1, ..., 9},{10, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [30, 32.143) duopoly [{1, ..., 8},{9, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [32.143, 34.5) duopoly [{1, ..., 7},{8, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [34.5, 37) duopoly [{1, ..., 6},{7, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [37, 39.6) duopoly [{1,...,5},{6, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [39.6, 42.27) duopoly [{1, 2, 3, 4},{5, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [42.27, 45) duopoly [{1, 2, 3},{4, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [45, 47.77) duopoly [{1, 2},{3, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [47.77 , 123 .14) duopoly [{1},{2, ..., 18}]
 
a
c ∈ [123.14, ∞) triopoly [{1},{2},{3,..., 18}]
        Table 1. Equilibrium partnership configuration for n = 18
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Coalition structure Conditions for deviation
(with MH)
Stability without
Moral Hazard
Stability with
Moral Hazard
{1},{2},{3},{4}, {5},{6} (none) By definition By definition
{1, 2},{3},{4}, {5},{6} for any a/c, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No No
{1, 2, 3},{4}, {5},{6} for any a/c, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No No
{1, 2},{3, 4}, {5},{6} for any a/c, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No No
{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5},{6} for any a/c, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No No
{1, 2, 3},{4, 5},{6} for a/c < 160, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
Yes Yes, for
a/c ≥ 106
{1, 2},{3, 4}, {5, 6} for a/c < 2.235, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
Yes Yes, for
a/c ≥ 2.235
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5},{6} for a/c ≥ 106, to
{1, 2, 3},{4, 5},{6}
for a/c < 57, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No Yes, for
57 ≤  a/c < 106
{1, 2, 3, 4},{5, 6} for a/c ≥ 2.235, to
{1, 2},{3, 4},{5, 6}
for a/c < 2.235, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
No No
{1, 2, 3},{4, 5, 6} for a/c < 3.55, to
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6}
for a/c ≥  106, to
{1, 2, 3},{4, 5},{6}
No Yes, for
3.55 ≤  a/c < 106
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} for a/c < 106,  to
{1, 2, 3},{4, 5}, {6}
for a/c ≥  106, to
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5},{6}
No No
Table 2. Equilibrium Binding Agreements (Ray and Vohra) for n = 6
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i N∈ 1               j N∈ 2
If   S(0, n) = ø
If   S(0, n) ≠  ø
σi(0, n) = N1
σi(0, n) = Yes    if # S(0, n) = 10
                 No    otherwise
σj(0, n) = N
σj(0, n) = No
If   S(1, x) = ø
If   S(1, x) ≠  ø
σi(1, x) = {i}     if x > 8
                X       if x ≤  8
σi(1, x) = Yes    if S(1, x) = X and
                                          x ≤  8
                 No    otherwise
σj(1, x) = X       if x ≤  8
               {j}     if x > 8
σj(1, x) = Yes   if S(1, x) = X and
                                          x ≤  8
                 No   otherwise
If   S(h, x) = ø,
             h ≥  2
If   S(h, x) ≠  ø,
             h ≥  2
σi(h, x) = {i}
σi(h, x) = No
σj(h, x) = {j}
σj(h, x) = No
Table 3. Strategies supporting the stationary and asymmetric equilibrium of  Γ
